Eurasia connectivity and potential risks for the BRI and INSTC.

The war in Ukraine caused the rejection of the Western world towards Russia, who was disconnected from the financial system dominated by the West, its reserves abroad were confiscated, and it finds itself in a war against NATO in Ukraine that it does not dare to be declared. The explosion of the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline is not an accident and it seeks to cut Russia's remaining ties with Europe, both in energetic and economical terms. Also, although the recent order issued against President Putin by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague will have no relevant effect on the global conflict, it is another tool in the information war and also seeks to cut Russia's remaining ties with Europe, this time in the legal and propaganda level.

Motivated by the explosion of Nord Stream 2, a Russian-European infrastructure project, I propose to take a look at other infrastructure projects in Eurasia and pay attention to potential risks of sabotage or destabilization. In particular, the new China Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the International North-South Transportation Corridor (INSTC). These are projects that seek to connect Eurasia and are key to the future development of different regions in Central Asia, South Asia, the West Asia, Africa, among others. Therefore, it is important to review these projects and study them in the context of the current global hybrid war between unipolarity (led by NATO) and multipolarity (led by Russia and China), as well as the potential current and future risks throughout their region.

NATO vs Rusia/China (Unipolarity VS Multipolarity)

When the bipolar world came to an end with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and unipolarity began, American political scientist Francis Fukuyama coined the phrase "The End of History." One model (the winner of the Cold War) would be the model of modernity and would ultimately be propagated globally across all nations. However, in 1998, American scholar Samuel Huntington contradicted Fukuyama's end of history and essentially predicted that the individualistic nature of the liberal model would clash with the idiosyncrasies, culture, and tradition of other people and their attempts of Westernization, predicting a "clash of civilizations." For some authors, this was the first theoretical indication of an forthcoming multipolar world, which is gradually consolidating with the end of globalization (or the beginning of deglobalization).

Many authors consider that the multipolar era took its first concrete steps when President Vladimir Putin delivered his famous speech to the Security Council in Munich in February 2007, expressing his anti-expansionist rhetoric towards NATO, which has been expanding closer and closer to Russian borders since 1949. 11 years later, in 2018, Putin announced a set of six new weapons with nuclear and hypersonic capabilities in a speech to the nation and the world. From that moment on, there was no doubt that the world was witnessing the emergence of an alternative pole, with the Russian people once again as one of the main actors. However, on the other hand, contrary to the Cold War era where we witnessed bipolarity, another Asian giant was emerging at an accelerated pace in economic terms, technological prospects, financial means, and nuclear weapons, we are talking about the People's Republic of China. Since the time of Deng Xiaoping, who carried out a series of reforms and the reopening of China to the world in 1978, the Asian country has grown by leaps and bounds and has become the world's factory. China, a millennial civilization with its own idiosyncrasy and strong in economic, financial, and military terms, forms another pole in the 21st century.

These three powers are the most concrete poles in the current global scenario and confirm the indications of Huntington's thesis. The terms unipolar and bipolar become obsolete or lacking in our time, which is experiencing a multipolar moment where more poles could arise in the coming decades. On the other hand, the internal divisions in the United States, where there were two schools of thought towards this multipolar moment, have forced a G2 of Russia and China against the United States. Quoting Dr. Jalife, during the 1970s and beyond, supporters of Henry Kissinger, former security advisor of Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, considered a G2 between the United States and China, while supporters of former Jimmy Carter advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski liked the idea of a G2 between the United States and China against Russia. Later on, in the 21st century, Kissinger seemed to lean towards advocating for a G2 between the United States and Russia against China [1]. This political ambiguity of the United States and its hostile policies towards both countries ended up completely tipping the scales in the opposite direction, they triggered a Russia-China axis against the United States. Referring back to the terms used by the philosophical school of A. Dugin, this could be paraphrased as a block (Eurasian by the moment) that looks for a transition to a world concretely multipolar, against an Atlantic block seeking to maintain hegemony and prevail a unipolar world.

In this conflict, confrontation occurs not only in military matters, with the movement of US troops withdrawn from Afghanistan and the current conflict in Ukraine, but also in financial matters, with Russia's expulsion from the international transfer system SWIFT, the appropriation of reserves abroad, and the emergence of alternative systems to SWIFT such as CIPS (in China) or UPI (in India), and also in economic matters, with the movement of factories in China (offshoring) to Mexico and the United States (nearshoring), and the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. These areas, along with others (information and media warfare, technological warfare, etc.), are part of a paraphernalia that makes up the current global hybrid war. Each of these areas is important by itself, however in this publication, I focus on the economic infratructure sphere, particularly on the projects of economic integration and connectivity in Eurasia and the potential risks they might face in this conflict between unipolarity and multipolarity.

Trade infrastructure projects and connectivity of Eurasia.

In terms of economy and connectivity, there are two potential projects that seek to connect the Eurasian region: the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), also known as China's new Silk Road 2.0. The INSTC [2] was initially agreed upon by Russia, India, and Iran in 2002, and Azerbaijan later joined. In 2022, it has already made progress with its first shipment from Russia's Astrakhan port to Mumbai's Jawaharlal Nehru port [3]. The INSTC is expected to reduce delivery times by 40% and result in a 30% cost reduction [4]. The INSTC starts in Mumbai, India, passes through the Gulf of Oman, arrives in Iran at the Chabahar port, where shipments can be stored or sent to Bandar-Abbas. Then, they must be directed to Tehran and transferred to Baku in Azerbaijan, where the route now passes through the Caspian Sea. Finally, the goal is for goods to reach the Astrakhan port and have access to Volgograd-Moscow-St. Petersburg. In this way, the INSTC is a commercial route that connects the Arabian Sea and the Caspian Sea, or, in another sense, it is a commercial and connectivity axis between India, Iran, and Russia, two members of BRICS and a potential member of BRICS+.

On the other hand, the BRI is a whole project just by itself and includes many dimensions. The BRI includes an economic belt, a maritime route, and a potential Arctic or Polar route. The BRI was launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping and is a giant and ambitious commercial project in which China has already invested a trillion dollars [5] (although its investment has been criticized by the Western press [6]). The World Bank estimates that world trade could increase between 1.7% and 6.2%, resulting in an increase in global real income of 0.7% to 2.9% [7]. These numbers, while valuable, conceal other potential gains, such as the "Yuanization" of Eurasia and the replacement of the US dollar, which is much more critical. Brazilian geopolitical analyst Pepe Escobar has already predicted a bang for the BRI in 2023, analyzing the conditions that have been forming for this year and forecasting favorable conditions for the yuan (although more linked to oil, with the petroyuan) [8].

The economic belt of the BRI is planned to pass through various cities in China and cross a range of countries in Central Asia such as Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. In this way, Chinese goods are connected with some countries in their immediate periphery, where they not only become important commercial hubs but also important actors in the initiative. It should be remembered that Uzbekistan already hosted the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Summit in 2022 in Samarkand, where many Eurasian countries participated. Then, the economic belt crosses and connects Iran and Turkey before passing through a range of Orthodox countries in Europe to reach Moscow and then continue its route to Europe in Germany and the Netherlands. Here we can note two things, the most immediate is that the economic belt seems to be damaged by the current situation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Additionally, the relationship between Russia and Germany (a major player in Europe along with France) is declining with the sabotage of Nord-Stream 2 and the ICC's court order against Putin, where once again Western politics (as in George Kennan's old theories) applies a kind of containment to Russia to prevent it from getting too close to Germany and avoiding the Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis. On the other hand, we note that Iran can become a geopolitical pivot in the region, with Tehran being an important commercial center for both the BRI and the INSTC, just like Moscow.

The Maritime Silk Road is a vital project as it starts from cities in southeastern China and travels through the South China Sea, connecting China with countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Moreover, it commercially connects China and India! India is considered by some authors as the fourth pole in the current multipolar world. Although China and India have had territorial disputes and have an alternate transaction system with the capacity to replace or complement SWIFT, such as CIPS and UPI, their tensions have been mediated by Russia [9]. In this way, since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, India has dramatically increased its acquisition of Russian oil [10], leaving aside the United States and has eased its differences with China. Then, the commercial maritime route connects with Sri Lanka (which is going through a catastrophic financial situation) and heads to Nairobi in the Republic of Kenya. Finally, it passes through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and then travels through the Red Sea and the Suez Canal towards Europe. Once in Europe, the Silk Road was planned to reach Athens and then Venice, where the maritime route and the economic belt connect.

Finally, a third initiative or attempt that is already less discussed in the current world situation but may have great geostrategic relevance is the third Silk Road, which passes through the Arctic. Currently, the project is in very early stages of development and therefore there is less discussion about it compared to the other two. In addition, there are extra complications for the realization of the polar or Arctic route as there is some reluctance since it is anticipated by some geostrategists that this would give China access and dominance in the Arctic, which is not the currently the case. This displays the high geostrategic importance of the Arctic region. Currently, the Arctic nations are Norway, Russia, Canada, Denmark, and the United States. In other words, NATO and Russia are the current owners of the Arctic, so Western countries would not look kindly on China getting involved. Although China has already launched its first white paper on its Arctic policy [11], there are different factors that are difficult to negotiate. In addition to the melting of the Arctic which can cause difficult conditions (although not impossible) for the project to be realized, valuable natural resources such as oil, gas, and minerals that can be found in the Arctic in larger quantities compared to Antarctica are also on the stakes [12]. There is no doubt that among the three Silk Roads, this could be the most technologically challenging to achieve. Additionally the strategic disputes of the Arctic makes the Arctic Silk Route the most difficult to complete.

Potential risks for Eurasian trading routes and connectivity.

Kindly, I have produced an image in which I plot the world but removing the American continent and I trace the different economic routes and corridors that I describe in the previous section (see header image). In addition, I include, as markers, the different points of interest in the region where various conflicts, interventions, or tensions have occurred worldwide along the BRI and INSTC. This image is useful because, if analyzed in the current international affairs context, it can provide clues about regions of interest where the BRI or INSTC could face problems in the short and medium term. Thus, the objective of this analysis is to lay the foundations for the study of regions where Eurasian infrastructure and connectivity projects could face problems and then be able to prevent, take action or pay special attention to these regions evolution.

One of the most immediate places to consider in this regard in the current situation is Europe, where the conflict between Russia and Ukraine has triggered a series of sanctions that cut off Russia's access to Europe. In fact, Russia slowly found that since the Minsk agreements, the Orange Revolution, and the Euromaidan, its fight against the West continued around its borders while NATO continued to expand. Thus, this whole series of events led to the current war in Ukraine, which has struck strong (although not lethal) financial and economic sanctions to Russia by the Atlantic block. Additionally, with the recent sabotage of Nord-Stream 2, the aim is to cut Russia's links with the rest of Europe and the option of including another country, such as Finland, in NATO is being considered. All this seems to be an aggressive and less-elegant version of George Kennan's old Containment policy, where one pushes back and seeks to contain Russia to ultimately prevent a Moscow-Berlin-Paris axis. I would call this a Thalassocratic policy. This is a hard stroke to the BRI because China has recently shown itself to be an ally of Russia at all levels, and the Silk Road then would not be easy to develop likely in Europe in the short and medium term. Just as Russia has been expelled from Europe, China could be too, along with its BRI, for geopolitical reasons. Therefore, currently, the strongest investments in the Silk Road must be made in Eurasia and not in Europe.

On the other hand, Turkey remains a reliable partner and the economic belt of the BRI does not seem to be at risk of complications from within Turkey, although the May 2023 elections will need to be followed to see if Erdogan continues or a regime change occurs. Despite this, the region between Turkey and Iran is not exempt from foreign pressures from the West, as former Trump administration officer John Bolton declared his support for an independent Kurdistan [13], which covers a significant region between the BRI economic belt and the INSTC. On the other hand, focusing on South Asia, it will also be important to alleviate any tensions on the border between China and India in the Arunachal Pradesh region in order to trade without complications to South Asia and East Asia. Similarly, the Kashmir region seems chaotic and a potential conflict between India, Pakistan, and China must be mediated and controlled. Otherwise, tensions could emerge at a level that damages India-China relations. In addition to the disputes over the Kashmir territory, India must pay special attention to the Khalistan movement, which could be exploited by Pakistan to extend the Kashmir disturbances to Punjab. I propose that in the same way that China became a security actor between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Russia or China should become mediators in this potential extension of the conflict between India and Pakistan. However, this negotiation could be more difficult than the reconciliation between Muslim countries, as both Pakistan and India possess nuclear weapons. However, in a future BRICS+ with Iran and the Saudi Arabia, Pakistan could feel more cornered and negotiations could be facilitated. This is:

BRICS+ with Iran and Saudi Arabia + China/Russia mediators = Possible resolution of the India-Pakistan conflict.

Now, if we consider the recent and young potential axis of Saudi Arabia-Iran, and if we pay attention to the INSTC route, then we can notice that the reconciliation between the Arab world and the Persian world could turn an old tension that could in principle be a complication for the INSTC into a new INSTC 2.0! That is, a tension already (so far) pacified between Arabs and Persians that could cause problems in the Strait of Hormuz, could now become an extension of the INSTC that through the Persian Gulf proceeds to reach Saudi Arabia and even connects with the maritime Silk Road route. That is, a new INSTC 2.0 that may extend to the Arab world and even to the African continent. Therefore, we can hypothesize that Iran, being both the commercial center of the INSTC and the BRI, as well as a potential member of the BRICS+, will become a geopolitical pivot in the region in the decades to come. On the other hand, the current conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan could cause potential problems at the commercial point of Baku. A potential escalation caused even by foreign groups could provoke an escalation of the conflict that is currently confined to the Nagorno-Karabakh region and is constantly being pacified by Russia. This is something that has to be watched closely in the years to come.

Going to the maritime route, this route may have problems right from its heart, in China itself. The most notable and obvious one is the potential conflict with Taiwan. Currently, US chip and semiconductor companies in Taiwan are moving their operations back to America due to a potential escalation in the China-Taiwan conflict (see). It's obvious that Taiwan is an objective for China that they are not willing to give up. However, this chinese objective should be pursued in the long term while avoiding military conflicts that, once semiconductor companies are gone from Taiwan, will only harm China and the maritime route. Indeed, this could provoke a similar cancellation by the Western world as the one orchestrated against Russia. However, China would be less affected than Russia due to its autarkic nature as a nation or civilization-of-state project. On the other hand, the Hong Kong protests and color revolutions are an issue that is difficult to spread to other regions in the vicinity. However, this could still be a matter of constant agitation. In addition, lesser relevance could also be given to the current conflict between Israel and Palestine or the events in Syria in terms of the realization of the maritime route, since its connection to Europe and its passage through the Suez Canal will have to be carefully analyzed in the years to come, taking into account the evolution of the international panorama. Despite this, for the Syrian cause, it could be a good thing that both the maritime route and the economic belt surround the country and this could eventually help with Syrian nation reconstruction and posterior development. In short, the biggest problem of destabilization at military level for the BRI maritime route comes from the conflict with Taiwan.

The polar or Arctic route, as mentioned before, faces its greatest problems in the Arctic geostrategic position itself. However, a current regional conflict that could affect the Arctic route is a potential escalation of the Korean conflict since the Arctic route starts from the Dalian region in China and then passes through Vladivostok before getting into the Arctic. On the other hand, the fact that Japan is nearby the Arctic route and that Japan is also the main US ally in Asia (yet not part of NATO) creates a possibility. Eventually, the United States could use Japan as a weapon against Russia and China, but this seems unlikely to happen just exclusively in the context of the Arctic route, which is the least developed of the three Silk Roads (although it could be the fastest and most efficient way to reach Europe since it crosses the Arctic, where distances are shorter). However, the end of the Arctic route seems uncertain since ties with Europe (at least at the level of Russia) are very damaged. In addition, a potential NATO membership for Finland could further complicate the passage of the Arctic route from Sabetta in Russia to Europe. Therefore, the Artic route may have many complications for its development. However, the problems of the Arctic route seem to be more of a nature of direct confrontation for an eventual dominance of the Arctic than for economical (trade) or energetic (oil, gas, minerals) reasons.

Finally, both the BRI and INSTC are projects for Eurasian integration that seek to modernize South Asia, Central Asia, East Asia, and West Asia regions in a peaceful way, as well as to generate connectivity with Europe and Africa. Furthermore, they seek to reduce transportation costs, spread wealth and development to Asian countries, and possibly provide the infrastructure to give an eventual place for the Yuan as the main currency of the Asian continent and of Eurasia, as a whole conceptual project. It is worth noting that at the military level, both the BRI and INSTC are surrounded by AUKUS, which, in my opinion, and I will put it in terms of Halford Mackinder, it is the last military barrier as a deterrence towards the Heartland if it gets to cross the Rimland (concept of Nicholas Spykman). Thus, we can see that all current conflicts surrounding Eurasian commercial infrastructure projects actually comprise the Rimland region, which prevents the Heartland from emerging. Thus, both the BRI and INSTC are Tellurocratic projects that have the potential to provoke unprecedented changes and lay the economic foundations for a multipolar world. Therefore they must be carried out while anticipating potential risks for their development and conclusion. In this way, a peaceful transition from a divided and fragmented Eurasia to a solid Eurasia with different poles can be carried out in the best possible way. As Xi Jinping mentioned to Putin during his recent visit, this could be something unseen in 100 years.